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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellee, the Town of Alta, agrees with the jurisdictional statement of Appellant, 
Paul Blackner (hereinafter "Blackner"). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court correctly grant the Town of Alta's Motion for Summary 
Judgment based on Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(11)? 
Standard of Review: 
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Collins v. Sandy City 
Board of Adjustment, 16 P.3d 1251, 1253 (Utah App. 2000). Additionally, M[M]atters of 
statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness." Platts v. 
Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 659, 661 (Utah 1997). This issue was preserved in the 
trial court in the Town of Alta's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 180) and the trial 
court's order granting summary judgment (R. 280-81). 
2. Did the trial court correctly grant the Town of Alta's Motion for Summary 
Judgment based on Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(13)? 
Standard of Review: 
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. Collins v. Sandy City 
Board of Adjustment, 16 P.3d 1251, 1253 (Utah App. 2000). Additionally, "[M]atters of 
statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for correctness." Platts v. 
Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 659, 661 (Utah 1997). This issue was preserved in the 
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trial court in the Town of Alta's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 180) and the trial 
court's order granting summary judgment (R. 280-81). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statute's interpretation is determinative or of central importance to 
this appeal: 
Section 63-30-10, Utah Code Annotated, as amended (1996) 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for 
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of 
an employee committed within the scope of employment 
except if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results 
from: 
* # * 
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or 
controlled lands, any condition existing in 
connection with an abandoned mine or mining 
operation, or any activity authorized by the School 
and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the 
Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
* * * 
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or 
natural disasters; 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below 
This is an action for personal injuries sustained by Blackner when he was caught 
in an avalanche in Little Cottonwood Canyon. Blackner brought suit against the Utah 
Department of Transportation and the Town of Alta, alleging that employees of these 
governmental entities were negligent for stopping traffic under a slide area and that their 
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negligence was the cause of his injuries. (R. 139). Both defendants moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-1 et seq., provided them with immunity. In particular, Utah Code Ann. §63-30-
10(11), provides governmental entities with immunity for any injury which arises out of, 
in connection with, or results from, any natural condition on publicly owned land. The 
Town of Alta argued that the avalanche was a natural condition on publicly owned land. 
(R. 180). Blackner argued that an avalanche is a "natural phenomenon" not a natural 
condition, so the statute did not apply. (R. 233-234). 
Additionally, the Town of Alta argued that it was entitled to immunity under Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-10(13), which grants governmental entities immunity for any injury 
which arises out of, in connection with, or results from, the management of a natural 
disaster. The Town of Alta argued that the first avalanche constituted a natural disaster 
that its deputy was managing when the second avalanche released. (R. 180-81). In 
response, Blackner argued that the first avalanche was "merely a spectacle of nature" and 
was not a natural disaster because it caused no actual harm or damage. (R. 232). 
At the hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment to both defendants, 
finding that they were immune from Blackner's suit under both Utah Code Ann. §63-30-
10(11) and (13). (R. 232). On appeal, Blackner has addressed only the trial court's 
award of summary judgment under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(13). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts were either assumed to be true in the court below or were 
uncontroverted in the record: 
On March 14, 1998, at 2:19 p.m., Dave Madera ("Mr. Madera"), an avalanche 
forecaster with the Utah Department of Transportation, was notified that an avalanche in 
Little Cottonwood Canyon had hit State Route 210 covering the down hill lane of traffic. 
(R. 164-65, fI[l-5). State Route 210 is a two-lane road that runs from Salt Lake City, 
through the bottom of Little Cottonwood Canyon, ending at the Town of Alta. (R. 165, 
13). Kevin Payne ("Deputy Payne"), a Deputy Marshal for the Town of Alta, was also 
notified of the avalanche at 2:19 p.m. and arrived at the scene approximately three 
minutes later. (R. 192-93, TI3-4). 
Upon his arrival at the scene of the avalanche, Deputy Payne became concerned 
that vehicles in both the uphill and downhill lanes would attempt to drive around the 
avalanche debris at the same time and collide head on. Therefore, he began to control 
traffic around the avalanche debris by directing each lane of traffic to take turns using the 
open lane. (R. 178,^4). 
Several minutes after Deputy Payne arrived at the site of the avalanche he was met 
by Mr. Madera. They discussed the situation, including the possibility of using a front-
end loader from Snowbird Ski Area to remove the avalanche debris from the road. 
Together they contacted Snowbird and arranged for the front-end loader. (R. 193, f6). 
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Mr. Madera then drove down the canyon to see if other avalanche activity was occurring 
in the lower canyon slide areas. (R. 165,16). 
Approximately 15 minutes after Deputy Payne and Mr. Madera called in the 
request, the front-end loader arrived at the scene of the avalanche and began to push 
avalanche debris off the side of the road. While the loader was working, traffic could not 
safely negotiate around both the loader and the debris. Therefore, vehicles in both lanes 
of travel were stopped to allow the loader to clear the road. (R. 178, 15). 
Approximately five to ten minutes after the loader began to clear the debris, 
Deputy Payne received a radio call from Mr. Madera. Mr. Madera explained that he had 
returned from examining areas down the canyon and was in one of the vehicles waiting in 
the uphill lane. Mr. Madera indicated that he had begun to worry about the safety of his 
location and asked how much longer the loader would be working. Deputy Payne 
advised Mr. Madera that the loader was taking its last scoop. Several seconds later 
another avalanche, emanating from a different location, tumbled onto the road and struck 
some of the vehicles stopped in the uphill lane, including plaintiffs vehicle and Mr. 
Madera's vehicle, pushing several vehicles off the road and down into the east end of the 
Tanner's Flat Campground. Plaintiff was injured as a result of this second avalanche. 
(R. 178-79,16). Mr. Madera was also caught in this second avalanche. (R. 166,110). 
The second avalanche hit at 2:53 p.m. (R. 166,18). The entire episode, from the 
time the first avalanche hit the road to the time of the second avalanche, was only 34 
minutes. (R. 166,19). 
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The area north of the canyon road, including the White Pine Chutes where both 
avalanches originated, is public land designated as the Twin Peaks Wilderness Area, 
which is managed by the National Forest Service as part of the Wasatch-Cache National 
Forest. (R. 179, f7). The avalanches were caused by natural forces and were not 
triggered by any avalanche control efforts being conducted in the canyon that day. (R. 
166,19). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In section I of its Argument, the Town of Alta explains that the trial court correctly 
found that it is entitled to immunity from Blackner's lawsuit under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. The Town of Alta moved for summary judgment on the 
grounds that it was immune from Blackner's suit under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(11) 
and (13), and the district court granted this motion under both provisions. However, in 
the Appellant's brief, Blackner did not address the trial court's order granting summary 
judgment based on Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(11). This alone mandates upholding the 
trial court's order. Despite Blackner's failure to address this issue, the Town of Alta 
explains below that the trial court was correct in finding that Blackner's injuries were 
proximately caused by natural conditions on public land and that the Town of Alta, 
therefore, was entitled to immunity. 
In his Appellate Brief, Blackner argues that the trial court erred when it granted 
summary judgment on the basis that the defendants were involved with managing a 
natural disaster - the first avalanche. Blackner asserts that the first avalanche was not a 
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natural disaster. The Town of Alta counters that the first avalanche was correctly found 
to be a natural disaster because it threatened to cause injury or death by blocking a lane of 
traffic and forcing vehicles moving in opposite directions to share one lane. Under the 
definition of "disaster" proffered by Blackner, the threat of injury or death is sufficient to 
constitute a disaster. Therefore, the trial court was correct in finding the Town of Alta 
was immune from Blackner's suit and granting its Motion for Summary Judgment on this 
ground. 
In section II of its Argument, the Town of Alta points out that in his Appellant's 
Brief, Blackner has attempted to raise issues that were not brought before the trial court. 
The Town of Alta argues that Blackner has waived such arguments by failing to raise 
these issues before the trial court. Even if this court considers Blackner's new issues, 
these issues are without merit. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, the Town of Alta argued that it was 
immune from Blackner's suit under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(11), since the injury 
suffered by Blackner arose out of a natural condition on publicly owned lands. (R. 180). 
Blackner responded in his memorandum opposing summary judgment that the avalanche 
was a "natural phenomenon," not a "natural condition" which would afford the Town of 
Alta immunity. (R. 233-34). The Town of Alta, in its reply memorandum, argued that it 
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did not matter whether the avalanche was called a "condition" or a "phenomenon," it was 
still entitled to immunity under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(11). (R. 251-52). 
At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the trial judge said: "[I]t's 
the Court's view . . . that the avalanche is a natural phenomenon, it is certainly a natural 
condition of the land . . . ." (R. 294 (Transcript of Hearing, p. 16)) (emphasis added). 
Finally, in the Order of Summary Judgment from which Blackner appeals, the trial court 
ordered: " 1 . That the defendants [Appellees] respective motions for summary judgment 
are granted pursuant to U.C.A. §63-30-10(11) and (13)." (R. 81 (Order of Summary 
Judgment)). Despite the fact that the issue of immunity under this subsection was fully 
argued below, and the trial court clearly granted summary judgment based in part on 
Utah Code Ann. §60-30-10(11), Blackner's brief fails to challenge this as a basis for his 
appeal. See Appellant's Brief, "Statement of the Issues," p. 2. This alone is a sufficient 
reason for this Court to uphold the trial court's decision. 
In his brief, Blackner repeatedly makes the erroneous argument that: "The singular 
issue on this appeal is that the lower court erred by concluding, as a matter of law, that 
employees of UDOT and the City of Alta were involved in the 'management of a natural 
disaster' prior to and at the time of the avalanche which hit the Appellant." Appellant's 
Brief, p. 19. See also Appellant's Brief, p. 10, ("This [management of natural disaster] 
was the singular basis for the lower court's ruling . . .." (emphasis in original)).1 As 
1
 To support his claim that the trial court's only basis for granting the motions for summary judgment was an 
erroneous interpretation of a natural disaster, Blackner clearly misquotes the trial court on pages 10-11 of his 
Appellate Brief. The actual quote from the trial court, with the portions omitted by Blackner underlined, reads as 
follows: 
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noted above, the trial court granted the Town of Alta's Motion for Summary Judgment 
based upon Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(11) and (13). (R. 281). Blackner has failed to 
claim any error in the trial court's decision finding the Town of Alta immune from 
plaintiffs suit due to plaintiff's injury arising out of, in connection with, or resulting from 
a natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands. Accordingly, Blackner has 
waived any argument that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on this 
basis. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 fn. 17 (Utah 1993). The trial court's decision 
granting summary judgment should be upheld on this basis alone. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE TOWN OF 
ALTA IS IMMUNE FROM THE PLAINTIFF'S LAWSUIT UNDER THE 
UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
A governmental entity's liability for injuries caused by it, or its employees, is 
governed by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§63-30-1 et seq. 
(the "Act"). Under the Act, "all governmental entitles are immune from suit for any 
injury which results from the exercise of a governmental function,. . .." Utah Code Ann. 
§63-30-3(1). The Town of Alta, as a political subdivision of the State of Utah, is a 
governmental entity entitled to immunity under the Act when exercising a governmental 
function. Utah Code Ann. §63-30-2(3) and (7). 
. . . it's the Court's view that the intention as communicated by the legislature in this statute is that -
that the avalanche is a natural phenomenon, it is certainly a natural condition of the land and that the -
a disaster is a situation that causes widespread damage to property that results from natural 
phenomenon. And in the Court's view this sort of condition would follow in the description of 
"widespread damage" and would therefore be within the statute and would allow the immunity to the 
entities that are sued here as the Defendants." 
(R. 294 (Transcript of Hearing, p. 16, lines 9-18)). The Court undeniably found that the avalanche that caused the 
plaintiff's injury was a natural condition on publicly controlled land. 
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A governmental function is defined as: "[A]ny act, failure to act, operation, 
function, or undertaking of a governmental entity . . .." Utah Code Ann. §63-30-2(4)(a). 
Further, "[a] 'governmental function' may be performed by any . . . employee . . . of a 
governmental entity." Id. at (4)(b). On March 14, 1998, Deputy Payne, an employee of 
the Town of Alta, was exercising a governmental function when he was assisting in the 
management of a natural disaster by controlling traffic around the debris of the first 
avalanche. Therefore, the Town of Alta is entitled to immunity under the Act for Deputy 
Payne's actions, or failure to act. 
Blackner has alleged that he has suffered injury proximately caused by the 
negligent acts or omissions of employees of the Town of Alta and the State of Utah. The 
Act waives immunity from suit "for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or 
omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment except if the injury 
arises out of, in connection with, or results from: . . . (11) any natural condition on 
publicly owned or controlled lands, . . . [or] (13) the management of flood waters, 
earthquakes, or natural disasters; . . .." Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(11) and (13) 
(emphasis added). As explained below, the trial court correctly found that the Town of 
Alta is immune from suit under these two exceptions. 
A. The Town Of Alta Is Immune From Suit Because Blackner's 
Injury Arose Out Of A Natural Condition On Publicly Owned 
Or Controlled Lands. 
As discussed more fully above, Blackner has failed to appeal the trial court's order 
granting summary judgment based upon Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(11). This alone is 
sufficient basis for this Court to uphold that decision. Furthermore, the trial court was 
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correct when it found that the Town of Alta was immune from Blackner's suit under Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-10(11) since his injury arose out of, in connection with, or resulted 
from a natural condition on public land. 
It is undisputed that the avalanches at issue in this case were natural conditions. 
Snow pack stability or instability is a natural condition in mountainous areas worldwide. 
Similarly, the avalanches that spawn from such instability are also natural conditions 
found in such areas, including Utah's Wasatch Mountains. Although such conditions can 
be triggered by human action, both purposeful and accidental, there is no evidence in this 
case that the avalanche activity in the White Pine Chutes on March 14, 1998, was due to 
anything other than natural conditions. (See R. 269) ("On March 14, 1998, no avalanche 
control efforts were occurring in the Little Cottonwood Canyon. Therefore, the 
avalanches on that day were the result of a natural condition which released naturally."). 
Moreover, it is also undisputed that the land on which the avalanches occurred is 
designated as wilderness, which is public land managed by the National Forest Service as 
part of the Wasatch-Cache National Forest Service. (R. 179). 
Plaintiffs injuries clearly arose out of, in connection with, or resulted from the 
natural avalanches that occurred in Little Cottonwood Canyon. The evidence presented 
below amply supports the trial court's finding that: "[T]he avalanche is a natural 
phenomenon, it is certainly a natural condition of the land . . .." (R. 294 (Transcript of 
Hearing, p. 16)). As such, the trial court correctly ruled that the Town of Alta was 
immune from Blackner's suit on the basis that Blackner's injuries arose out of, in 
connection with, or resulted from the natural condition of publicly owned lands. 
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Accordingly, even though Blackner failed to appeal this basis of the lower court's ruling, 
the decision of the trial court was correct and should be upheld. 
B. The Town Of Alta Is Also Immune From Suit Because Deputy 
Payne Was Assisting With The Management Of A Natural 
Disaster. 
The trial court also found that the first avalanche was a natural disaster, and 
concluded that the Town of Alta was immune from suit for Deputy Payne's traffic control 
efforts in managing this natural disaster. (R. 281 (Transcript of Hearing, p. 16)). This 
conclusion by the trial court is supported by the undisputed evidence and should be 
upheld. 
Under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, a governmental entity retains 
immunity from suit when the "injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: . . . 
(13) the management of . . . natural disasters." Utah Code Ann §60-30-10(13). A few 
minutes prior to the time that Blackner sustained his injuries, Deputy Payne responded to 
the scene of a natural disaster - an avalanche that was then covering half of the road and 
endangering motorists. The threat of injury, loss of life, or loss of property caused by 
traffic moving up and down the canyon around an avalanche while sharing a single lane 
was obvious. Deputy Payne undertook management of this natural disaster by enacting 
traffic control measures to protect the public and by mobilizing heavy equipment to 
remove the dangerous obstacle. 
In his brief, Blackner cites Utah Code Ann. §63-5a-2(l), which defines a 
"disaster." Blackner argues that the first avalanche, which blocked the downhill lane of 
traffic on a busy canyon road, "did not fit the definition of a 'disaster' since it did not 
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create a situation causing, or even threatening to cause (1) widespread damage; (2) social 
disruption; (3) injury; (4) loss of life; or (5) loss of property." Appellant's Brief, p. 15. 
This argument completely ignores the relevant language of the statute that defines a 
disaster under Utah law. By quoting that definition below, with the emphasis of 
underlining, the court can easily see that the first avalanche meets the statutory definition 
of a disaster: 
"Disaster" means a situation causing, or threatening to cause, 
widespread damage, social disruption, or injury or loss of life 
or property resulting from attack, internal disturbance, natural 
phenomenon or technological hazard. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-5a-2(l) (emphasis provided). 
The first avalanche was unquestionably a disaster under this undisputed definition. 
Blackner argues that this avalanche was not a disaster since there was no actual 
"widespread damage." However, widespread damage is not the only requirement for a 
situation to amount to a disaster under the above definition. Nor is actual injury or actual 
loss of life required. Under the above-cited definition of disaster, the threat of injury or 
loss of life caused by natural phenomenon is sufficient to constitute a "disaster." 
As explained in point "A," supra, both avalanches were natural phenomena. By 
blocking the downhill lane of traffic, the first avalanche clearly threatened to cause injury 
or loss of life by forcing downhill traffic to use the same lane of traffic as the uphill 
traffic. Deputy Payne was not required to wait until a head-on collision caused actual 
injury or death before taking action to manage the disaster. The first avalanche was a 
disaster that Deputy Payne was managing when Blackner was injured in a second 
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unexpected avalanche. Therefore, the trial court correctly determined that the first 
avalanche was a natural disaster, and concluded that Deputy Payne was involved in the 
management of that natural disaster when Blackner was injured. 
Throughout his brief, Blackner downplays the significance of Deputy Payne's 
actions following the first avalanche, referring to these actions as "simple traffic control 
and nothing further." Appellant's Brief, p. 18. However, traffic control around the 
avalanche, and efforts to remove the avalanche debris and re-open the buried lane of the 
road, were indispensable aspects of managing this disaster. This should not be surprising 
since traffic control and debris cleanup are typically important parts of managing any 
natural disaster. Blackner simply is incorrect in his argument that Deputy Payne's actions 
were too minor or unimportant to constitute management during a disaster. 
As part of his argument that the trial court erred in determining that the first 
avalanche was a natural disaster which afforded the defendants governmental immunity 
from his suit, Blackner cites the case Nelson By and Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake 
City, 919 P.2d 565 (Utah 1996). However, in his brief, Blackner fails to explain how the 
Nelson case relates to the case at hand. Regardless, the Nelson case is easily 
distinguished from the case at hand. In Nelson, the Jordan River was a constant and 
known hazard. The government knew that any time a child wandered too close to the 
river, the child could fall in and drown. In the case at hand, the second avalanche was not 
a constant hazard. It was only dangerous on those rare occasions when the snow 
dislodged, without human intervention, with sufficient intensity to cover the road below. 
At all other times, traffic could move up and down the canyon safely. Prior to its release, 
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the second avalanche was an unknown hazard. This is proven by the fact that Mr. 
Madera, the avalanche forecaster for UDOT, was parked below the slide area when he 
notified Deputy Payne of the potential danger and was himself caught in the second 
avalanche seconds later. 
In Nelson, the government erected a fence, a permanent solution to protect people 
from the permanent hazard posed by the Jordan River. In the case at hand, Deputy Payne 
was attempting to manage and provide an immediate solution to a temporary hazard - the 
debris left by the first avalanche - when Blackner was struck by a second unexpected 
avalanche. In Nelson, the government was negligent in maintaining the fence, and a 
child was able to get through the fence to the Jordan River. The fence had been erected 
to protect people from this very hazard. In the case at hand, Deputy Payne's efforts were 
designed to prevent motorists from running into each other, a hazard very different from 
the avalanche that actually injured Blackner. Accordingly, Nelson is clearly 
distinguishable from the case at hand and does not support Blackner's claim that the 
Town of Alta is not protected from his suit by governmental immunity. 
The undisputed evidence supports the trial court's determination that the first 
avalanche was a natural disaster under Utah law and that Deputy Payne was helping to 
manage that natural disaster. Therefore, the trial court was correct in concluding that the 
Town of Alta was immune from suit under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(13). 
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II. BLACKNER IS ATTEMPTING TO RAISE ISSUES FOR THE FIRST 
TIME ON APPEAL. 
In his brief, Blackner, for the first time, raises a number of issues that were not 
raised or argued before the trial court. By failing to raise these arguments before the trial 
court below, Blackner has waived any right to present them on appeal. Crooks ton v. Fire 
Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 800-801 (Utah 1991). Blackner's attempts to 
introduce arguments for the first time on appeal are inappropriate and such arguments 
should be disregarded. For example, Blackner now claims "policy considerations" 
warrant ignoring the clear provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 20); that the Town of Alta knowingly placed him in harm's way 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 18); and that the Town of Alta neglected its duty to maintain roads 
in a safe condition (Appellant's Brief, p. 12). These arguments are improper because they 
were not raised before and there is no legal basis for such arguments. 
Even if this Court chooses to consider these inappropriate arguments, they lack 
merit. For example, there is no evidence to suggest that Deputy Payne knew that 
Blackner was stopped in harm's way. Additionally, Blackner ignores the plain language 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act which explains that a claim for failure to 
maintain roads is trumped by the two exceptions to immunity discussed herein. See Utah 
Code Ann. §63-30-8 and compare with §§63-30-10(11) and (13) (immunity for 
dangerous condition of highway is waived "unless the injury arises out of one or more of 
the exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10"). Accordingly, none of the new 
16 
issues raised by Blackner are meritorious and should not affect the decision of the district 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellee respectfully requests that the court affirm 
the district court's judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this *Zc day of March, 2001. 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
David C. Richards 
George W. Burbidge 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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1 Cottonwood Canyon in March of 1998, and Mr. Blackner was 
2 injured along with other people as a result of that avalanche. 
3 Our argument today and our motion is based on the argument 
4 of immunity, which we feel are entitled - it isn't - is 
5 available to us because of 63-30-10 (1 \\ which talks about: 
6 "Immunity is preserved for conditions 
7 which arise out of a natural condition on 
8 a public land." 
9 I think the facts are fairly undisputed in terms of a 
10 situation on that particular day. It is a state road. 
11 U.D.O.T. has the sole authority to close mat road. An 
12 avalanche occurred. If you look at the diagram here, White 
13 Pine Chute, Number 3, which traveled to one lane of traffic on 
14 the road, preventing traffic from going up and down the 
15 canyon. U.D.O.T. was called. The avalanche forecaster, Dave 
16 Medara (phonetic), arrived at the scene, evaluated it The 
17 Alta Town Marshal also came to the scene to help coordinate 
18 traffic. Mr. Medara continued down the road, came back and 
19 noticed that all of the traffic was stopped because a front-end 
20 loader was removing the snow from the road. It was at that j 
21 time that the second avalanche occurred and then knocked 
22 everyone off the road. 
23 This is a situation where U.D.O.T. did not trigger the 
24 avalanche. It wasn't an avalanche control effort. It was an 
25 unexpected situation. And if called to testify, the avalanche 
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1 PROCEEDINGS. 
2 THE COURT: This is the matter of Paul Blackner v. State 
3 of Utah, et al; Case No. 990906368. 
4 Counsel, will you enter your appearances, please. 
5 MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, Tad Draper here on behalf of Paul 
6 Blackner. 
7 MS. STEINVOORT: Sandra Steinvoort on behalf of the State 
8 of Utah, Department of Transportation. 
9 MR RICHARDS: Dave Richards on behalf of the Town of 
10 Alta. 
11 THE COURT: Now, there are two motions for summary 
12 judgment. They appear to me to raise very similar issues. 
13 Mr. Draper, do you see a distinction or should I just have 
14 the Defendants argue their motions -
15 MR DRAPER: I don't see a distinction. It's their 
16 motions, but I think that they're all the same issues. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Let's go ahead. I'll hear from 
18 the Defendants in this case, and whoever wishes to speak first 
19 may proceed, and then I'll (Inaudible). 
20 MS. STEINVOORT: Thank you, Your Honor. If may I approach 
21 for just a moment? (Handing). 
22 Mr. Richards and I were discussing this earlier. We 
23 assume that the Court's pretty familiar with the facts of this 
24 case, and I'm not sure how much you want us to go into it other 
25 than say that there was an avalanche that occurred in Little 
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1 forecasters would tell you that White Pine Chute 3 and 4 are i 
2 the ones that most infrequently run. So, the fact that White 
3 Pine Chute ran, Number 4, ran that particular day, and ran 
4 across the road was completely unexpected. I 
5 We think there is a strong policy argument in addition to | 
6 the immunity aspect of this case which is quite clear that we 
7 can't be second-guessed in making these decisions. The first 
8 avalanche occurred at 2:19, the second one occurred at 2:44. 
9 There was a very quick time frame here in which to respond and 
10 to make an evaluation. At all times when Mr. Medara was on the 
11 road, he was evaluating the avalanche situation. He was trying j 
12 try coordinate and decide whether or not the whole road should I 
13 be closed; and that would mean, in essence, locking people up 
14 at Snowbird and Alta and preventing people from the coming up 
15 the canyon. And that decision isn't made lightly. It has to 
16 be made after considering the conditions and consulting with 
17 other individuals like Alta and Snowbird to advise them of 
18 what's going to be happening. 
19 We just think that immunity is quite clear here. We know 
20 that Mr. Draper has argued about the special relationship, and 
21 I will allow him to address that and then respond to that, Your 
22 Honor. But we don't believe a special relationship argument is 
23 necessary when immunity is quite clear and stated in the Code. 
24 Do you have any questions? 
25 THE COURT: Thank you. 
HIT TTUH/AV nr^r o-
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1 MR. RICHARDS: Good morning, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Good morning. 
3 MR. RICHARDS: ijust want to pomt out a coupk of things 
1 4 in the memoranda that 1 think are important I think first of 
5 all it's real important that the Plaintiff has accepted as true 
6 all of the facts that are alleged and set forth in the 
I 7 memoranda Alta submitted. For purposes of summary judgment, 
8 those are deemed as accepted by both sides. And under those 
9 set of facts, it's pretty obvious, I think, that the injury 
10 occurred during the management of a natural disaster. The 
11 Plaintiff supplied the definition of a natural disaster from 
12 the Comprehensive Emergency Management Act from the State, and 
13 that Act basically says that if an injury occurs - and it 
114 defines a "natural disaster" as a situation "threatening to 
15 cause injury or property damage as a result of a natural 
16 phenomenon." And I can't imagine something more on point in 
17 this case. As Ms. Steinvoort, indicated, there is absolutely 
18 no indication that the avalanche was caused by humans. It 
19 certainly wasn't triggered through U.D.O.T.'s effort And they 
20 have the ability and responsibility to control avalanche danger 
21 in Little Cottonwood Canyon. I should say, except for the 
22 resorts, themselves, just to be fair. Obviously this didn't 
123 happen on resort property. 
124 The first avalanche occurs. Dave Medara, UD.O.T.'s 
25 avalanche forecaster responsible for the whole canyon meets 
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1 Alta's Deputy Town Marshal at the scene where this avalanche is 
2 partially blocking the road. They talk about what to do. Dave 
3 Medara says, "I'm going to go down canyon. I need to take a 
4 look at a couple more slide paths. See what's going on." What 
5 was going on was unusual. And I don't know if you read some of 
6 the attachments, but it was an unusual March day inasmuch as it 
7 was reaDy warm and there was no wind. And so you had a lot of 
8 a wet slabs letting go, apparently. Regardless, Mr. Medara 
9 wants to go down canyon and take a look at a couple of 
10 additional slide paths to see what's going on. 
II Kevin Payne (phonetic), Alta's Deputy Town Marshal, says, 
12 "Fine. Let's call a front-end loader in from Snowbird and get 
13 this debris off the road," because traffic was trying to make 
14 its way around this using one lane and he saw the danger in 
15 that. And while Medara went down, Payne continued to allow one 
16 lane to go and stop it, allow the other lane to go until the 
17 front-end loader arrived ten or fifteen minutes later. The 
18 front-end loader went to work and in a matter of about ten 
19 minutes had most of the snow pushed off. 
20 Kevin Payne gets a phone - gets a radio call when the 
i21 loader was on its last load saying, "This is Dave Medara. I'm 
22 down at the bottom. I've assessed conditions in the canyon. I 
23 think where we've got traffic stopped. I'm a little nervous 
24 about it. How much longer do you have?" And Mr. Payne said, 
25 "We are on our last load." He said, "Fine." Within seconds, 
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1 the second avalanche lets go. And hits, obviously, the traffic 
2 including the Plaintiffs vehicle. 
3 But 1 think what's important from that is to understand 
4 this all happened within 34 minutes. And in that 34 minutes, 
5 you have the guy responsible for avalanche control in the whole 
6 canyon and the marshal on duty that met at the scene, came up 
7 with a plan, decided what was best and impkmented it. And I 
8 guess if they would have had another 30 seconds, there may not 
9 have been a problem. But those are the kind of decisions that 
10 government endues have to make during a natural disaster. 
11 You don't delegate those type of decisions. And I think as a 
12 policy matter hindsight, Monday morning quarterbacking of those 
13 type of decisions is easy to do but it's darn hard for those 
14 people that have made the decisions to - to see those Monday 
15 morning quarterbacking calls at the time they are trying to 
16 prevent loss of human life and property damage. 
17 The other - the other issue we raise was the natural 
18 condition of public land. And, again, I can't think of 
19 anything more natural on public land than a naturally occurring 
20 avalanche in Little Cottonwood Canyon in the middle of a 
21 wilderness area. And I think bom of them are directly on 
22 point. 
23 I am going to sit down. If the Court has any questions, 
24 I'd be happy to address them. 
25 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
_ _ 
1 Mr. Draper. 
2 MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, if I might? 
I 3 THE COURT: YOU may. 
4 MR. DRAPER (inaudible) statute we are dealing with, Your 
! 5 Honor. 
6 Your Honor, for us to lose this motion today, the Court 
7 must find that this avalanche was a natural disaster, was a 
I 8 disaster. I mean, we have - if the Court finds that it was, 
! 9 we lose. And I want you to - if you would, Your Honor, please 
110 look at Subparagraph A of the statute I've given you, 53-2-102, 
11 "Natural Phenomenon." It specifically identifies an avalanche 
12 as a natural phenomenon. 
13 Now, can a natural phenomenon become a disaster? If you 
14 look up at Number 2, it tells you that: 
15 "A 'disaster' means a situation 
16 causing or threatening to cause 
17 widespread damage, social disruption or 
18 injury or loss of life or property 
19 resulting from attack (and there it is) 
20 ' natural phenomenon'." 
21 So, an avalanche in and of itself does not create a 
22 disaster. It has to fit within the parameters of that 
23 definition. 
24 Now, if Mr. Blackner, who's sitting back there in the back 
25 of this courtroom, were driving up that highway, up that road 
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1 and an avalanche wiped him out, there's no case. There is 
2 absolutely no claim. Because we would agree it is - it is not 
3 a natural condition because that's a static circumstance. 
4 That's snow. That's the Grand Canyon. That's things like 
5 that. But the natural phenomenon is something dynamic that 
6 happens in nature without anyone's involvement And we agree, 
| 7 we are not claiming that they started mis avalanche or that 
8 they had direct cause of putting the avalanche into motion. If 
9 Mr. Blackner were driving up the canyon, an avalanche wipes him 
110 out, there is no case. 
II Wel l why is this such a good case? Well, the reason is, 
12 Your Honor - is that the avalanche that took out Mr. Blackner 
13 is not the avalanche that they were cleaning up. And that's 
14 the critical distinction. 
! 15 What did the avalanche that they were cleaning up cause? 
16 It doesn't even fit the definition of a disaster. The one they 
17 were cleaning up was not threatening to cause widespread 
18 damage, social disruption or injury, of loss of life or 
19 property. It was snow on the road. And it wouldn't have any 
20 more of a consequence than if there had been a nasty car 
21 accident up there on the highway. They don't call it a 
22 disaster because there is a car accident. It still requires 
123 traffic to move. It requires people directing traffic and 
J 24 managing that aspect of it. 
25 So, we have an event that takes place. We have a natural 
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1 phenomenon which in and of itself means nothing. And they are 
I 2 cleaning it up. They are not under any definition, any stretch 
3 of the definition, dealing with a disaster. 
[ 4 Now, they did create a disaster. These guys stopped 
5 traffic right under White Pines Chute Number 4. What did they 
6 say? I heard her say, "completely unexpected." There are 
7 signs all up that road, everybody is aware of them, about 
| 8 avalanche danger, and no stopping or standing. They had every 
9 opportunity to stop these cars at some other place. They chose 
10 to stop them there. And if the Court will indulge me with 
III maybe somewhat of a silly analogy but, I think, on point, let's 
12 use the Grand Canyon. Let's suppose there's an accident right 
113 along the side of road that goes along the Grand Canyon. And 
14 it is a car accident. And they have traffic control And the 
115 crazy traffic officer is directing people to go off the edge of 
16 the Grand Canyon. Now, this is as absurd as stopping somebody 
117 in an avalanche zone, I agree. But, you know, like leminings, 
! 18 these cars just keep plunging over the side. And then they 
19 come in and argue immunity because it is a natural phenomenon 
20 or a natural condition. "We're exempt from immunity (sic)." 
21 The issue here is proximate cause. And the cause of 
22 Mr. Blackner being wiped out and stopped and parked there is 
23 because he was instructed and told to do so. 
24 Now, he's at the bottom of the canyon driving up that 
25 road, and Mr. Medara is in a U.D.O.T. vehicle driving up the 
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1 road. He's got the radio. They have been talking about what's 
2 happening with the avalanche up the hill mat they are dealing 
3 with. And then he drives right on up and parks his vehicle 
4 right where they are cleaning up. He gets out of his vehicle. 
5 Mr. Blackner gets out. All these people are out looking at 
6 this avalanche cleanup thing. 
7 And all of a sudden "run." So, he makes a dive for his 
8 car, and, of course, he's wiped out along with several other 
9 people. 
10 Your Honor, I want it to be really understood, I don't in 
11 any way expect somebody, the State of Utah, the City of Alta, 
12 anyone, to be responsible for something that just naturally 
13 occurs. And this same avalanche could have gotten 
14 Mr. Blackner, this very same avalanche, Mr. Blackner, under 
15 different circumstances and there is no case. But where he's 
16 stopped right there and they are not in the process of cleaning 
17 up a disaster and they even directed him - we are dealing with 
18 an issue of instructional - putting - placing the public in 
19 harm's way. Now, that's not an immune function under any 
20 stretch of the imagination. And for the Court to rule in favor 
21 of their motion, they must - Your Honor must o^lermine that 
22 they were in the process of cleaning up a disaster. And where 
23 is -- the slightest indication? The only damage and injury was 
24 o n e - you know, the accident - the avalanche that followed 
25 thereafter. 
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1 I don't think any of the other exceptions that they've 
2 claimed, exemptions from immunity, fly. For purposes of this 
3 motion, the Court must consider negligence, that there was 
4 negligence and is there immunity? That's the basis of their 
5 motion. 
6 And so, Your Honor, I think that - unless you have any 
7 questions, that's the nuts and bolts of where mis - where the 
8 law, I think, sits on this thing. The only thing I repent is 
9 not having filed my own motion for the Court to determine that 
10 under the facts as we know them and the affidavits submitted, 
11 that this was not a disaster. This avalanche was not 
12 threatening to cause widespread damage, social disorder, 
13 injury, loss of life, et cetera. I mean - my final comment, 
14 Your Honor: If you look at 1-15, what a mess that is. Every 
15 time there is a accident on 1-15, do we determine that that's a 
16 disaster? I mean, everyone colloquially will say, "Hey, man, 
17 that's a disaster up there on the freeway." But legal 
18 definition? You know, and that's - that's traffic at its 
19 worst. You have an accident or event that affects a few people 
20 in an isolated circumstance, and they have the ability to 
21 control it but choose not to, in fact, to control it 
22 incompetently by placing people under an avalanche chute. Then 
23 there is responsibility and not immunity. 
24 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
25 MS. STEINVOORT: Just one thing, Your Honor. I think that 
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1 these photographs help illustrate why we perceive it as a 
2 disaster. And I provided these to Counsel before. The first 
3 photograph I'll (Inaudible) is - they are both - as you can 
4 see, the snow on the top of the photograph is the first 
5 avalanche. And it's hard to explain and express how fast this 
6 happened. Mr. Medara was at his post at Alta, he gets the call 
7 at 2:19 and he responds. It is our position that it is a 
8 natural condition, that it was unexpected, that - Mr. Madera 
9 was caught in the same avalanche, went off the side of the 
10 road. It wasn't as if he was deliberately putting people in 
11 harm's way. The traffic was not flowing, Your Honor, it was 
12 slowed down. And the question was: "How do we get this 
13 cleared up in order to get people moving along?" And the 
14 decision was made to bring up the front-end loader and clear 
15 the traffic. And, of course, now we all say, "Well, gosh, wish 
16 we hadn't done that." But at the time it seemed to be the most 
17 prudent, practical thing to do, rather than having people 
18 slipe-sliding back and forth. The same group of people would 
19 have been sitting under this traffic chute. Maybe it wouldn't 
20 have been Mr. Blackner directly. It could have been another 
21 individual. There's certainly about nine statements from 
22 people who all went off the side of the road who experienced 
23 it. It was unexpected. It was a natural condition. We are 
24 entitled to immunity as a result of that. And the legislature 
25 has made that decision. We cannot go back and second-guess 
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1 efforts that are made to control an avalanche or to manage an 
2 avalanche situation that occurs unexpectedly on a Saturday 
3 afternoon. 
4 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 
5 MS. STEINVOORT: Thank you. 
6 THE COURT: Anything more you (inaudible). 
7 MR. RICHARDS: Just real briefly. Thank you. 
8 I'm not sure that Mr. Draper was actually saying that a 
9 natural phenomenon can't be a disaster under this statute. I 
10 think he ~ I think that is what he is saying ~ 
II MR. DRAPER: That is what I'm saying. It can be 
12 (Inaudible)--
13 MR. RICHARDS: - which eliminates epidemics, droughts 
14 forest fires, avalanches, landslides, floods, storms, tornados 
15 and earthquakes. I'm left wondering what other sort of things 
116 could actually occur that aren't natural disasters. Maybe 
117 pestilence. Maybe we've forgotten pestilence. But I don't 
118 think that's the intent of the statute, is to say that a 
19 natural phenomenon can't be a natural disaster. I think that 
20 it's obvious that natural phenomena cause natural disasters all 
21 the time. And I think it is also important to point out that 
22 Mr. Draper's example of the car accident or directing traffic 
23 off the side of the Grand Canyon, it wouldn't fall under 
24 natural disaster. Because natural disasters, as according to 
25 this statute, are situations that threaten to cause injury to 
I rage ID 
1 lose - injury to property or life because of four things 
2 only: Attack - I am not sure what that is, but I'll leave it 
3 to the Court's imagination - internal disturbance, natural 
4 phenomena or technological hazards. So, this statute doesn't 
5 make everything a natural disaster. It doesn't make the wreck 
6 by the side of the road a natural disaster. It makes 
7 widespread events that result from the natural phenomenon that 
8 threaten human life and threaten property a natural disaster. 
9 It might not have been the biggest natural disaster that' sever 
10 hit the state, but it certainly was a natural condition that 
11 threatened life and threatened property. Why else was Kevin 
12 Payne there directing traffic and letting one lane go at a time 
13 and not letting opposing lanes of traffic share one lane? I 
14 think it's pretty obvious that it is - it's darn dangerous to 
15 do that. And that's why the Town Marshal at Aha, Deputy Town 
16 Marshal, was there trying to prevent people from running into 
[ 17 each other so they weren't injured themselves. 
! 18 So, was it a huge natural disaster? No. Was it a natural 
119 disaster under this statute? You bet it was. 
20 That's probably all I need to add at this point. I did 
21 want to add, though: I don't think we addressed the natural 
22 condition of public land as being an avalanche. I mean, 
123 Mr. Draper says: "If you find this was a natural disaster, he 
24 loses." I think I agree with him. He also forgot to add: "If 
25 you find that an avalanche is a natural condition of the public 
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1 land, he also loses." 
2 Thanks. 
3 THE COURT: Thank you. 
4 The Court is going to grant the motion for summary 
5 judgment for both Department of Transportation and the City of 
6 Alta. It's the Court's view in examining the applicable 
7 statute that though there's certainly some basis for discussion 
8 - and I think Plaintiff has done an excellent job of raising 
9 the other way of examining this, it's the Court's view that the 
10 intention as communicated by the legislature in this statute is 
11 that - that the avalanche is a natural phenomenon, it is 
12 certainly a natural condition of the land and that the - a 
13 disaster is a situation that causes widespread damage to 
14 property that results from natural phenomenon. And in the 
15 Court's view this sort of condition would follow in the 
16 description of "widespread damage" and would therefore be 
17 within the statute and would allow the immunity to the entities 
18 that are sued here as the Defendants. 
19 I'm going to ask Ms. Steinvoort if she would prepare an 
20 order to that effect. 
21 MS. STEINVOORT: I will. 
22 MR. RICHARDS: Your Honor, might I ask? Is the Court 
23 going to issue specific findings about loss of property or 
24 anything? I mean, I don't know if the Court is intending to do 
25 special findings or we are just going to go through 
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1 (Inaudible). 
2 THE COURT: rd be comfortable, Counsel, if you would 
3 prepare findings that would find both the disaster and the 
4 natural condition law (Inaudible) Court indicated verbally. 
5 MR. DRAPER: Your Honor, my specific request in that 
6 regard is -- and I am not trying to argue on that, but in terms 
7 of defining the "natural disaster," the elements have to be met 
8 (Inaudible), with - is the Court going to make specific 
9 findings on the elements of the disaster that's listed 
10 (Inaudible)-
11 THE COURT: That's my intention. I've asked Counsel to 
12 prepare such an order and such findings. Tliank you, 
13 Mr. Draper. 
14 (Hearing adjourned.) 
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